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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
JAMES SICILIANO,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE
WE S T E R N RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No.
9378

BRIEF OF AP'P'ELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff instituted this suit under the provisions of
the Federal Employers Liability Act to recover damages
for an eye injury alleged to have been sustained on September 8, 1952. The case "ras tried before a jury in
October, 1960. Prior to commencement of the trial, defendant demanded and the court called a special venire.
During the course of the selection of the jury from the
special panel, the court on its own motion and without
legal cause excused two of the proposed jurors. The
parties put on their evidence and the defendant moved
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the court for a directed verdict. The court denied defendant's Inotion and the jury re,turned a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff. Damages \vere assessed at $30,000 and
diminished by $7,500 by reason of plaintiff's own negligence. Judgment was entered on the verdict. Defendant's
motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and
for new trial were denied. This appeal challenges the
judgment below on the grounds that the court erred in
denying the defendant's motions for directed verdict, for
judgment n.o.v. and for new trial and committed prejudicial error in arbritrarily excusing qualified jurors
from the special panel and in instructing the jury.

STA·TEMENT OF FACTS
On September 8, 1952, the plaintiff, James Siciliano,
was working as a machinist in the defendant's shops in
Salt Lake City. Siciliano and a fello\v employee, Bob
Wells, had been working in a drop pit, taking do\vn a
spring rigging on a railroad locomotiYe. In the course
of their work, Wells required a piece of wire so that he
could tie back a brake bean1. ,,~ells asked Siciliano to
go and get a roll of \vire that he had seen hanging on a
post about 20 to 30 feet fron1 \vhere they \vere \vorking.
The accident occurred when Sieiliano took the \vire fro1n
the post.
Siciliano was the only \\Titness to the accident. The
wire (Exhibit D-1) consisted of a roll about 8 to 10 inches
in diameter. It \Ya~ hanging over a nail on a post just
above the level of Siciliano's head. The shop was ,veil
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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lit and Siciliano could clearly see what he was doing.
Siciliano claimed that as he took the wire from the nail
with his right hand it flipped and that a loose end penetrated his eye causing the eye injury (R. 99). The major
dispute in the evidence arises as to the manner in which
the wire was removed from the post. On direct examination, Siciliano said (R. 99) :
"I ltfted it up and all at once it sprung on
my eye. I lifted it up with my right hand and I
dropped the wire when it hit my eye ... "
On cross examination he said (R. 114):
''I just grabbed it."
In furnishing a report of the accident to the Railroad
Company, he said (Ex. D-2) :
"As I pulled wire off post it flipped in my
eye.''
'I did not know the wire would flip when I
jerked it from the post."
4

In the same report Siciliano indicated that he blamed
no one for the accident.
Siciliano related the circumstances of the accident
to his foreman, Paul Schenk, on the day following the
accident. As to this Schenk testified (R. 183):
''Well, he said he needed a piece of wire and
went to this post, gave it a jerk, and a piece of
it hit him in the eye.''
During cross examination of Siciliano, he was asked by
counsel if he had told Schenk that he "jerked" the wire
from the post. He replied (R. 121):
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"I don't remember whether I told him I
jerked it or not."
Plaintiff took the position, of course, that the wire had
been "lifted" and not "jerked" fron1 the post.
In defendent's shop employees were instructed to
pick up wire or other materials froin the floor, and in
the case of usable wire, to hang the same on posts within
the shop· so that it might be used in the work of the shop
(R. 185). The men were not instructed to wind the end
of the roll in such a way as to bind it to the rest of the
roll thereby preventing use of the \Yire before unraveling
and straightening of the ends (R. 185).
Defendant offered testimony concerning the custom
and practice of hanging usable wire on posts in the
working area of local shops where it \vas readily available
for use by employees in the course of their work. The
plant superintendent of a local shop doing heavy industrial work testified that at the time of the accident it
was the custom and practice to hang usable wire over
hooks on posts located in the working areas. In the shop
where this witness was employed, Structural Steel and
Forge ·Company, there "~ere 50 to 100 hooks used for
just that purpose (R. 196-198). It \Yas not the practice
to tie the ends of loops of \\'"ire placed on these posts.
The witness stated:
"We never tie then1" (R. 198).
Defendant also called a master mechanic employed
with the Southern Pacific Railroad. The witness was
familiar with the defendant's shop where the accident
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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occurred and was employed in the Southern Pacific shops
in Ogden at the time of the accident. It was the custom
and practice in the Southern Pacific shops to hang usable
wire on posts \vhere employees could obtain it. This was
done on posts located throughout the shop and the ends
of the \Vires were not tied down (R. 199, 200).
There was no evidence as to any practice of tying
the ends of rolls of wire.
Although the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, they found, as disclosed by their verdict, that the
plaintiff himself was guilty of negligence which was a
proximate· cause of the accident (R. 62).
The defendant moved the court for a directed verdict
at the close of plaintiff's case and again when defendant's
evidence was in (R. 174, 175, 201, see also R. 10, 11).
The basis of the motions was that there was no competent
evidence of negligence on the part of defendant and that
if there was any negligence which resulted in plaintiff's
alleged injury it was solely the negligence of the plaintiff
himself. The court denied these motions.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S l\[OTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
AND FOR JUDGMENT N.O.V.
(a) There is no evidence of negligence on the part

of the defendant.
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(b) The negligence of the plaiutiff in jerkin[J the
w~re

from the post was the sole proxtmate
cause of the accident.

POINT II.
TI-IE ·COURT COM~1:ITTED PREJUDICIAL

ERR.OR IN ARB IT R A R I L Y EXCUSING
QUALIFIED Jl"rRORS FRO~[ THE SPE·CIAL
PANEL.
POINT III.
T HE COURT COM~1ITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GI\TING IKSTRUCTIOX NO. 7
vVHICH IN SUBSTA~~CE AND EFFECT INSTRUCTED THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD A DUTY TO ELIMINATE THE
·CONDITION WITH WHICH THE JURY WAS
CONCERNED.
POI~T

rv·.

T HE COl~RT C0~11IITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GIVING IXSTRl"'"CTION NO. 16
WHI·CH IN SUBSTA:\CE .A.XD EFFECT
AUTI-IORIZED RECOVERY BY THE PLAINTIFF EVEN TH0llt1H HIS XEGLIGEXCE
WAS THE SOLE ·CAUSE OF THE """\CCIDENT
1\XD }~\·I~~N THOUGH DEFEXD"""\XT'S XEGLIGENCE WAS NOT A PROXI~I"""\TE CAUSE OF
THE AC·CIDENT.
POINT V.
TI-IE TRIAL COURT C()j[\LITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO.
6 INVOLVING AN ISSUE NOT PRESENTED
BY THE PLEADINGS OR THE EVIDEN·CE
AND NOT BEFORE THE COURT OR THE
JURY.
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POINT VI.
THE TRIAL (~0l~l{1 COJ\[:\llTTED PREJUDI(~L.\l.J ERROR IN REFUSlXG TO GIVE DEFEND1\Nri1'H l~l~~(~ l ~ 1~Srfll1 ~D INSTRUCTIONS
N<>~. 6 AND 11 \\Tl-liCH WOULD HAVE DIRECTED rcl-fE ~JURY THAT IN DETER1\1:INIXG \YIII~~rl iiER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT
,,~_.\S NEGLIGENT THEY SHOULD TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THAT DEFE~DANT
HAD THE RIGEIT TO Af--;S1 1 ~TE THAT ITS
1 1 ~~Il>LOYEES WOULD EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY.
1

1

POINT. VII.
A GROSS A ,V.ARD OF $30,000 FOR PLAINTIFF'S .AJjLEGED INJURY IS SO EX·CESSI\~1~ lTXDER THE CIRCUMSTAN·C·Es OF
THIS CASE AS TO CO,MPEL THE CONCLUSION THAT THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED
BY PASSION AND PREJUDI·CE IN ASSESSING DAMAGES AND THE TRIAL ·C·OURT
COl\I~fiTTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DENYING DEFEXDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL BY REASON OF EXCESSIVE
D.AJ.I . .~GES.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDAXT 'S 1\IOTIOXS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
AND FOR ~Jl~DG~IENT N.O.V.
Liability under the Federal Employers Liability Act
arises from negligence and not from a mere showing of
injury. Further, it must be shown that the negligence
'vas the cause of the injury. It is still the function of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the state trial and ap·p·ellate judges to determine when
the evidence is sufficient to justify submssion to a jury
on the issues of negligence and proximate cause. The
United States Supreme Court, though very solicitous of
the role of the jury in F.E.L.A. cases, has not stripped
the court of its right and duty to determine whether
or not a jury question exists. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
his concurring opinion in Wi:lkerson v. l.~lcCarthy, 336
U. S. 53, 69 Sup'. Ct. 413, said:
"The easy but timid way out for a trial judge
is to leave all cases tried to a jury for jury determination, but in so doing he fails in his duty
to take a case from the jury when the evidence
would not warrant a verdict by it. A timid judge,
like a biased judge, is intrinsically a lawless
judge.
"These observations are especially pertinent
to suits under the Federal Employers Liability
Act."
The observation, of course, is equally pertinent at the
app~ellate level.

Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 320 U.S. 476, 64 Sup. Ct.
232, states the prevailing rule in F.E.L.A. cases with
respect to proof of negligence and proximate cause. In
that case the plaintiff obtained a judginent for the death
of her husband. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
reversed the judgment and the United States Supreme
Court affirmed. Mr. Justice Reed for the 1najority of the
court said:
"The weight of the evidence under the Employers Liability Act must be more than a scintilla
before the case may be prop,erly left to the disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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cretion of the trier of fact - in this case, the
jury. (Citing cases) When the evidence is such
that without "\Veighing the credibility of the witnesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion
as to the verdict, the court should determine the
proceeding by non-suit, directed verdict or otherwise in accordance with the applicable p-ractice
\vithout submission to the jury, or by judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. By such direetion of
the trial the result is saved from the mischance
of speculation over legally unfounded claims.
(Citing cases) ... The rule as to when a directed
verdict is p.roper, heretofore referred to, is ap~pli
cable to questions of proximate cause (Citing
cases). . . . L~ability arises from negligence not
from injttt~ry under this Act. And that negligence
must be the cause of the injury (Citing cases)."
It is therefore still the law and the federal rule that
juries do not determine liability in F.E.L.A. cases in
the absence of substantial evidence of negligence on the
part of the defendant and p~roof that the negligence
complained of \Yas a proximate cause of the injuries.

(a) There i;s no evidence of negligence on the part

of the ,defendant.

Plaintiff's claim is that he was injured when he
handled a piece of wire. The evidence discloses that there
was a roll of \vire with free ends hanging on a post in
defendant's shops. This was customary and usual in
defendant's shops and in other shops in the area. We
submit that there is no permissible inference to be drawn
from these facts which in any way indicates negligence
on the part of the Railroad Company.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In order to prove negligence on the part of the
defendant, plaintiff must produce evidence from which
a jury could reasonably find that the defendant should
have foreseen the probability that a person handling the
wire 'vith ordinary prudence and care might sustain
injury. (Defendant was entitled to assume that the wire
would be handled by its employees in a careful and prudent manner. Ferguson v. Reynolds, 52 litah 583, 17G
Pac. 267.)
Plain tiff contended before the trial court that the
roll of wire constituted a·· trap" or a latent danger. There
is nothing intrinsically or inherently dangerous in a roll
of wire. It is one of the most simple items used in the
industry. This is not to say that a piece of wire, if improperly handled, may not strike objects. This may happen by mishandling at any tilne. It could occur when
the wire is picked up from the floor: 'Yhen it is placed
upon or removed from a table or a 'vall or a post; 'Yhen
it is unrolled for use or when it is actually being placed
in use. Similarly, pinchers "~in pinch, ha1n1ners 'vill crush~
nails 'vill puncture and glass "ill cut if nlishandled. But
the mere presence of a roll of "ire hanging on a post
did not present to James Siciliano an •'unreasonable
risk of harm" and the practice or Inethod of placing "Tire
with free ends upon posts throughout the shop 'vas not
'·negligence."
Proof of an .accident is not proof of negligence nor
is proof of "'danger" proof of negligence. TT' illia1ns v.
Ogden Union Railway and Depot Conzpany, 119 Utah
529, 230 P. 2d 315; Horsley v. Robnison_. 112 lTtah 227,
186 P. 2d 592.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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.1\.ssurning, contrary to hwnan experience, that the
\\ . irP hanging on the post in defendant's shop \\~as a
potential source of danger to the plaintiff even had he
handled it in a careful and prudent manner, plaintiff's
eontention of negligence overlooks the funda1nental
proposition that liability to a servant is not predicated
upon Hdanger" but negligence and that negligence is
never i1nputed frou1 the employ1nent of methods in general use in the, business or industry involved. Ellis v.
L. & N. R. Co., 251 S.W. 2d 577; Cheffey v. Pennsylvania
llailroad Company, 79 F. Supp. 252; Prattico v. Hudson
C01al Con~pany, 341 Pa. 490, 32 Atl. 2d 733.
The court in Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 222 N.C.
3G7, 235 S.E. 2d 334, was confronted with the identical
question posed in this case. There the plaintiff contended
that the railroad company was negligent in failing to
provide a light indicating the dangerous position of a
derailer. There \Yas no custom or practice of placing
warning lights on derailers. The Supreme Court of North
·Carolina said:
'"The fact that there was no light on the small
target indicating the position of the derailer in
question under the circumstances of this case,
would not alone be evidence of negligence, in the
abse1lce of showing that. placing lights on such
target 1ras in accord with the general and approved 'USage."
The United State8 Supreme Court affirmed the State
court decision. As to the absence of a light on the derailer, the court said (320 U.S. 476, 480, 64 Sup. Ct.
232,235):
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"As to the light, it is nowher_e shown tha~ ~t
was customa;ry or even ,desi·rable tn t~e opera.tton
of this or .any other railroad to equ'l)p dera1Jlers
with such a siynal.''

Thus, the plaintiff's contention that the defendant was
negligent in maintaining a derailer without a warning
light was rejected and the judgment on the jury's verdict
was set aside. In the case at bar plaintiff has wholly
failed to show that the method and practice employed
by the industry or in similar industries was to bind the
free ends of a roll of wire. The undisputed evidence indicates the contrary. That is, that the prevailing custom
and usage in the industry is to hang rolls of wire in the
\vorking areas of industrial shops without binding the
free ends. There is nothing in this practice which is contrary to due regard for the safety of defendant's employees, and we submit that the defendant was as a
matter of law not guilty of negligence in follo,ving the
prevailing custom and practice in this regard.
Under the doctrine of the Brady case foreseeability
is still a necessary element of negligence on the part of
a railroad company. The state court decision in the Brady
case discussed this element at length and the following
quotation from this opinion represents a general summary of the law as it now stands :
"Where the duty to guard against injury to
others grows out of certain relationships and circumstances, breach of such duty i1nposes responsibility for consequences '"·hich are probable and
which could reasonably have been foresee~ accqrding to ordinary and_ usual experience,' bu.t
not for consequences ~vh~·ch .are me·rely possible
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~accordiug

to occasional experience. Stone v.
Boston l\: A. R. Co., 171 Mass. 536, 51 N .E. 1, 41
L.R.A. 7~-1-. •The rttle is that one is bound to anticipate those consequences of his negligent act or
o1n-ission. u·hich in the ordinary course of human
experi'ence, IHight reasonably be expecte1d to result tlterefront.' 38 Am. Jur., 710. Foreseeability is
a necessary element in actionable negligence, and
111ust be made to appear before liability can be
imposed for the consequences of a wrongful act
or omission. This principile was stated in Osborne
v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., 207 N.C. 545, 177 S.E.
796, as follows: 'The law only requires reasonable
foresight, and when the injury complained of is
not reasonably foreseeable, in the exercise of due
care, the party \\?hose conduct is under investigation is not answerable therefor.' This statement
of the la-\v has been frequently cited with approval,
and the principle applied in numerous cases. Butner v. Spease, 217 N:C. 82, 6 S.E. 2d 808; Guthrie
v. Gocking, 21-! N.C. 513, 199 S.E. 707; Newell
v. Darnell, 209 N.C. 254, 183 S.E. 374; Beach v.
Patton, 208 N.C. 134, 179 S.E. 446. Justice Cardozo, in Bird v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
22-! N.Y. 47, 120 N.E. 86, 88, 13 A.L.R. 875, expressed the same idea in these words : 'The wrongdoer may be charged with those consequences and
those only within the range· of prudent foresight.'
In ~Iilwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94
U. S. 469, 475, 24 L.Ed. 256, it was that 'it must
appear that the injury was the natural and probable consequence of the negligence or wrongful
act, and that it ought to have been foreseen in the
light of the attending circumstances.' From Stone
v. Boston & A. R. Co. [171 Mass. 536, 51 N.E. 3,
41 L.R.A. 794], supra, we quote, 'One ~s bound to
anticipate and prov~de ~against what 'Hsu.ally happens and 1rhat is likely to happen; but it would
impose too heavy a responsib~l~ty to hold him
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bound in like manner to guard against what is
unusual and tttnlikely to happen, or what, .as it is
sometin~es sa~d, is only remotely and slightly probable.' Snyder v. Colorado Springs & ·C. C. D. R.
Co., 36 Colo. 288, 85 P. 686, 8 L.R.A., N".S., 781,
118 Am. St. Rep.. 110.
'' 'The substance of it all, stated and restated
in various ways is that negligence carriJes wi-th it
liability for consequences which, in the light of
attendant circumstances, could reasonably have
been antvcip.ated by a pru.dent man, but not for
casualties which, though possible, were wholly ilnprobable. One is not charged with foreseeing that
which could not be expecte.d to happen.' Wyatt v.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 158 ,---a. 470, 163
S.E. 370, 373, 82 A.L.R. 386."
The accident "\vhich occurred in this case was a freak
accident. Plaintiff recognizes this as evidenced by his
requested instructions (R. 19). It "\vas not one "\vhich
n1ight be expected in the ordinary course of hmnan experience. Although the plaintiff could foresee no injury
from the handling of the "ire (R. 119, 120), he expects
the Railroad Company to be clairvoyant in this regard.
\\T e know of no other court case or experience of railroad
comp~anies indicating a similar occurance. To require the
defendant to foresee this accident or to foresee harm to
the plaintiff is to impose liability "~ithout fault.
The practical side of the judg1nent below is to make
the Railroad Company an insurer of the safety of it~
employees while they are handling "\Yire. \\~''ire is necessary in the operation of a railroad shop, and if men are
to perform their "\vork they n1ust handle it. If "ire is to
be used, it must be handled "\vith the ends free. It canSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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not be eu1ployed in u~l} until the- ends are free. It makes
absolutely no difference \vhether the \\"ire is placd on a
flat surfaee or hung on a vertical surface. There is just
no '"reason" in a finding that the defendant was negligent because a piece of \vire \vith free ends was hanging
on a post in its shops. If the key word in the area of
negligence la\v is ••reasonable" as we understand it to
be, \\re respectfully submit that the judgment below must
be set aside, for a finding that the defendant was guilty
of actionable negligence under the circumstances of this
case simply does not comport with reason or with justice
and fairness under the law.
(b) The negligence of the plaintiff in jerking the
u''ire from the post was the sole proximate
cause of the accident.

The defendant contends that the plaintiff was negligent in jerking or pulling the wire from the post. This
was the contention in the court below; this was the theory
of the defendant's cross examination of the plaintiff, and
of its argument to the jury. ·This is the only respect in
\Yhich the evidence \Vas in conflict. The jury found that
the plaintiff was guilty of negligence and diminished
the a\vard accordingly (R. 62). This necessarily amounts
to .a finding that the plaintiff jerke-d or p~ulled the wire
from the post. This mishandling of the wire was the
sole cause of the accident.
The defendant had no duty to anticipate that the
plaintiff \vould jerk the \\"ire from the post. The Brady
case, supra, is closely analogous in this respect. Plaintiff's decedent had been killed in a derailment and p~lainSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tiff urged inter alia that a defective rail was the canst~
'
'
of the accident.
Evidence
of experts disclosed that the
rail on which defendant's car was riding was "so worn
on top· and sides that ... it permitted the thrust of the
east wheels of the car, as they rose over the 'wrong end'
of the derailer, to force the flange on the west wheels
over the defective rail and so to derail the cars." The
evidence also disclosed that in the absence of such
defective condition no derailn1ent \vould have occurred
"nine times out of ten." There was, ho,vever, no evidence
of the unsuitability of the rail for ordinary use. The
United States Sup·reme Court, in holding that the defendant railroad company had no duty to anticipate
that the cars would be run over the \Vrong end of the
deraile~r and that the defective rail would thus constitute
a dangerous condition, said (320 lT.S. 483, ±84, 64 Sup.
·Ct. 236, 237) :
~'The

Supreme Court of North Carolina [222
N.C. at page 370, 23 S.E. 2d at page 338] was of
the view that striking a derailer from the unexpected direction '"'"as so unusual, so contrary to
the purpose' of the derailer that provision to
guard against such a happening was beyond the
requirement of due care. With this we agree.
Bare possibility is not sufficient. Milwaukee, etc.,
R. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, at page 475, 2-!
L. Ed. 256: 'But it is generally held, that, in order
to warrant a finding that negligence, or an act
not amounting to wanton wrong, is the proximate
cause of an injury it must ap~pear that the injury
was the natural and probable consequence of the
negligenee or wrongful act, and that it ought to
have been foreseen in the light of the attending
circumstanee~·'.

Events too remote to require reasonable prevttSton need not be anticvpated. . . .
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llere the ra~l was sufficient for ordinary use, and
the car,rier was not obliged to foresee and guard
against misuse of the derailer, even though the
1nisuse occurred as oft-en as the ev~dence. indicated.
It was the wrongful use of the ,deJr.aiiler that imJned~ately occasione,d the harm. Decedent had
first closed and then opened the derailer on the
first movement. He signalled the train to back
into the storage track just before the fatal accident. Although this misuse of the derailer was
an act of negligence, it is mere sp,eculation as to
whether that negligence is chargeable to the decedent or another. Without this unexpected occurrenrP, the adequacy of the rail vis-a-vis a properly
used derailer is unquestioned. It was entirely
disconnected from the earlier act of the carrier
in placing the weak rail in the track. The mere
fiact that with a so?md rail the acc~dent m~ght not
have happened is not enough. The oarrier's negligence must be a li·nk in an unbroken chaim of
reasonably foresee1able events."
It was the wrongful use or mishandling of the wire
which resulted in plaintiff's injury in this case, and the
mere fact tha~ this accident might not have occurred
had the free ends of the wire been bound is not enough
to charge the defendant with liability. There is no evidence that the wire was not safe for ordinary handling.
vVe respectfully urge that the only reasonable inference
that can be drawn from the evidence is that the practice
of hanging wire on a post with free ends was safe at
least for ordinary handling. Here, as in the Brady case,
it was the "wrongful use ... that immediately occasioned
the harm'' and ~'the carrier is not obliged to foresee and
guard against misuse.''
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e submit that in this case the record before the
court demonstrates that the jury found the plaintiff
negligent in jerking the wire from :the post; that the
defendant had no legal duty to foresee or anticipate the
misuse or mishandling of said wire; that the defendant
in allowing said wire to be placed on the post was not
guilty of negligence, and that if this accident was caused
by the negligence of any person, it was the negligence
of the plaintiff in jerking the wire from the post. F-or
the reasons above stated, the case should be remanded
to the district court with instructions to dismiss the
action.
7
'\

POINT II.
THE ·COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN ARBITRARILY EXCUSING
QUALIFIED JURORS FRO~I THE SPE·CIAL
PANEL.
In every F.E.L.A. case defendant is faced with the
proposition of defending what the public considers to be
a wealthy corporation against the claim of an employee
injured in the course of his \Vork. The tendency of many
jurors is to .award damages \vithout regard to fault. The
background, experience and integrity of the jurors \vho
decide these cases are vital. Whether counsel like it or
not, they are faced in every case \Yith the proposition
of judging the probable vie,vpoint and attitude of each
prospective juror. While there may be doubt as to the
success achieved in this endeavor, the fact is that it is a
vital part of success in the la\\'"suit. The trial court in
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thi~

('HSe explained t hP pro('PSs of peremptory challenges
to the jur~~ as follows (R. 82) :
HThey use their own discretion based on what
t hp~· learned about the jurors, what your knowledgP and experience has been, they weigh your
ha('kground and place of residence, and anything
the~T can learn about you, and your other fellow
jurors, and determine which one can best serve
and solve the issue in this case. They also determine your ability to be fair and impartial. That
is \\·hy \\'"e carry on this little examination."
In this case the court on its own motion and \vithout
cause exeused t\vo prospective jurors, Stanton Peck and
l{a~- . ..\. Norton.
Peck was the fourth juror dra\vn from the name
box. Ilis address was given .as 1440 Laird Avenue in Salt
Lake Cit~~, Utah. He was associated with Allsteel Office
Supply Company.
Norton gave hls occupation as a job development
specialist \\Tith the Department of Employment Security.
His address was listed as 1722 Harvard Avenue, Salt
Lake City, l~tah.
The court excused these two jurors after the following inquiry (R. 89, 90):
··THE COURT: (speaking to the jurors) ...
I would like to have you become acquainted with
the parties. James Siciliano is the gentleman sitting at the center of the table with the white hair.
Sitting on his left is ~Ir. l\Ie~Iillan and l\Ir. Beck,
his attorneys. On Mr. Siciliano's right is Mr. Clif-
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ford Ashton who is raising his hand. He is the
attorney for The Denver and Rio G:ande ~estern
Railroad Company. Are you acquainted With any
of these gentlemen~
Mr. PeckMR. PECK: I know Mr. McMillan and Mr.
Beck.
THE COURT·: Is that a business acquaintance~

MR. PECK: Yes.
THE COURT: Do they deal with your business~

MR. PECK: Just that we have Mr. McMillan
on the books.
THE COURT: He is a customer of

yours~

MR. PE.CK: That is right.
Peck was thereup·on excused by the court. The court
then continued (R. 90) :
Mr. Norton~fR.

NORTON: I am acquainted with Mr.
1\IcMillan, in fact we are related.
THE ·COURT : How close are you related f
MR. NORTON: Second cousins, his father
and I are cousins.
THE COURT: That excuses You
. ' the la\v
says those related second cousins or closer have
a problem, ... "
Thus Peck and Norton were eliminated as jurors by the
court. We point out that there was no challenge made
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by either counsel and that the basis for the court's action
in each instance was a relationship between the juror
and counsel.
In excusing the two jurors, the trial court no doubt
had in mind Rule -1:7 (f) which gives a litigant the right
to challcnrJc a juror for cause because of the relationship
of debtor and creditor or consanguinity existing between
the juror and a party. There is no rule of law or statute
in force in this state which disqualifies a juror because
he is a creditor of or related to counsel. The common
law· rule is stated in Petcosky v. Bowman, 197 \T a. 240,
89 S.E. 2d 4:
"It is well settled that at common law a juror
is not disqualified by the fact that he is related
to one of the counsel in the case. (Citing authorities)"
But even had there been a right to challenge jurors
Norton and Peck that right existed in favor of the litigants, and the court had no right whatever to arbitrarily
excuse the jurors. The right to challenge a juror is a
right which may be waived and in this case had there
been a right to challenge the jurors for cause said right
would have existed in favor of the defendant. In the
case of Browning v. Bank of Vernal, 60 Utah 197, 207
Pac. 462, the court stated the rule as follows :
"The fact that a juror sustains the relationship of debtor or creditor to a party to an action
does not disqualify the juror to act, but it gives
the litigant the right to challenge for cause such
juror."
This rule \\Tas affirmed in the case of State Bank of
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Beaver Cownty v. Hollingshead, 82 Utah 416, 25 P. 2d
612.
In the case at bar the jurors were excused at the
direction of the court without motion of either party to
the suit. Since dismissal of the jurors was n1ade without
motion, counsel for the defendant had no opportunity
to object before the jurors were excused. Rule 46 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that formal ex·ceptions to the orders of the court are unnecessary. Rule
46 further provides that
"If a party has no opportunity to object to
a ruling or order at the time it is made, the
absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him."
In this case there was no indication at all before the
jurors were excused that the court \Yas going to excuse
the jurors from the panel. Under Rule 46 counsel had
no duty to tell the court that it had erred or to object
to that which had already been directed by the judge.
Counsel was placed in the position of remaining silent
as he had a right to do under Rule 46 or challenging
in the p-resence of the jury an order already made by
the court. It is common thing to take issue "ith opposing
counsel. This is expected by court and jury alike. To take
issue with the court at the outset of a la\Ysuit is a different proposition. Under Rule 46 it \Yas not necessary
for counsel to question an order already made. The error
IS therefore preserved.
It is difficult to say \vhat actual effect the two
jurors might have had on the outco1ne of the case had
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they been allowed to serve. Notwithstanding any relationship betwePn the jurors and counsel for the plaintiff,
the t\\·o 1nen \vho were excused by the court were considert•d by the defendant to be desirable jurors and the
defendant \vould not have exercised one of its peremptory ehallenges against either of them. These men were
both \Yhite-collar office workeTs who each resided in
a 1niddle or high income residential area of the city.
Coun8el for defendant are of the impression that the
experience ordinarily encountered by jurors such as
X o1'ton and Peck and their position as office workers
qualify them to decide the issues more impartially than
the laborer or lo\v income 1nan whose sympathies often
lie \vith a fellow laborer who has been injured in the
course of his work.
It has also been counsel's experience that women
jurors are often influenced by sympathy and compassion for an injured plaintiff to the point of disregarding
the i:ssue of liability. In this case the defendant would
like to have excused the women jurors and particularly
the juror, Maxine Beck, who bore the same name as on<~
of plaintiff's counsel. With its three peren1ptory challenges, defendant excused other jurors who were felt to
be more dangerous. However, had the court not excused
jurors X orton and Peck, the woman juror, Maxine Beck,
'vould not have been on the jury. (See Jury List- R. 9)
Counsel for plaintiff makes some interesting suggestions in his affidavit (R. 65-A) 'vith respect to what
\\Te assume he is urging he would have revealed to the
court had X orton and Peck not been excused by the
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trial judge. Nothing in this "belated testimony" of counsel is pertinent in considering the propriety of the dismissal of the jurors or the effect thereof.
·The point, of course, is that the defendant, and the
defendant alone, had the right to challenge (if there had
been basis for a challenge) and to decide who it would
excuse peremptorily. The only legitimate inquiry of the
trial court was the legal qualifications of the prospective
jurors. These qualifications were met in the instant case.
Beyond this, the court had no right to tell either or both
parties to the lawsuit that a qualified juror would be
excused and would not serve as a member of the jury
any more than he could instruct counsel that a specific
juror must serve on the jury panel.
The right of counsel to exercise their limited right
of choice by making their own decisions as to who they
''rill excuse seems to us to be a basic right in a jury
trial. If that right is to be preserved, our appellate court
cannot overlook or disregard interference with the right
at the trial level. ·Certainly this court cannot say that
the error 'vas not p.rejudicial. A holding that the aggrieved party must show prejudiee "ritl1 certainty in
cases of this kind simply leaves the litigants with a
hollow right "'hich 'vhen denied or interfered 'vith cannot be enforced.
We respectfully submit that the defendant is entitled to try this la,vsuit before a jury empaneled according to the statutes and rules of the state courts.
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POIN'T III.
T HE COURT CO~l~IITTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 7
\VlliCH IN SUBSTANCE AND EFFE,CT INSTRlTl~TED THE JURY THAT THE DEFEND1\:KT, HAD A DUTY TO ELIMINATE THE
·CONDITION WITH WHICH THE JURY WAS
l (>NCERNED.
1

By Instruction No. 7 the court instructed the jury
as follows:
'·You are instructed that a continuous duty
exists on the part of a carrier, such as the defendant in this case, to use ordinary care in furnishing
its employees with a reasonably safe place in
which to work. This duty does not require the
absolute elimination of all danger, or hazard, but
it does req~tiJre the elimi,nation of ,all danger or
hazard which the exercise of reasonable care could
rcnzove or guard ~aga~nst, and this applies to the
condition with which we are concerned. The
amount of caution required by that duty varies in
direct proportion to the dangers known to be involved in this work. To put the matter in another
way, the amount of care required of a railroad
company in the exercise of ordinary care, to furnish its employees with a reasonably safe place
within which to work, or safe tools and equipment increases or decreases as do the dangers
that reasonably should be ap·prehended. Failure
of the defendant to discharge this duty of using
reasonable care to provide its employees with a
safe place in which to work or with safe appliances, equipment or tools for his work would
constitute negligence."
Exception was duly taken to this instruction upon
the ground that the use of the words ' but it does require
4
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the elimination of all danger or hazard which the exercise of reasonable care could remove or guard against,
and this applies to the condition with which we are concerned" amounts to a co1nment by the court that the
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care (R. 208).
While the general language of this charge properly
instructs the jury, the ap.plication of a specific portion
of the charge to the condition in question amounted to
a directed verdict against defendant on the issue of its
negligence. The court probably intended to instruct the
jury that the condition in question was to be considered
in light of the entire charge. However, this is not the
effect of the language used. The charge instructs the
jury that the defendant is not required to absolutely
eliminate all danger or hazard but must require the
elimination of all danger or hazard which the exercise of
reasonable care could remove or guard against, and this
applies to the condition with 'Yhich we are concerned. The
use of the co-ordinate conjunction ''but" followed by the
use of the pronoun "this" brings home to the jury that
the condition involved in the case is one which the Railroad Company was required to eliminate.
The language of this instruction fun1ished the answer for the jury on the issue of the defendant's negligence. It could not have been more prejudicial had the
court specifically instructed the jury that the defendant
was guilty of negligence as a matter of la,v. The specific
portion of this charge is not cured by the general language. This court has held that the specific portion of
the charge controls and that 'vhere the JUry can only
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bl) confused by an application of the specific to the
general, the court must reverse for a new trial. St,ate v.
Jlcndrick~, 123 Utah 2G7, 258 P. 2d 452; Jensen v. Utah
llail1ray CuHlpany, 73 Utah 356, 270 Pac. 349; Heywood
v. The Denver and RiJo G11ande Western Railroad Campa ny, 6 lTtah :2<1 155, 307 P. 2d 1045; State v. Waid, 92
rtah 297, ti7 P. 2d G-17. We submit that this error is so
glaring that no extended argument is necessary to demonstrate either the fact of error or its prejudicial nature.

POINT IV.
THE COURT COM~llTTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN GI\TING INSTRUCTION NO. 16
''rHICli IN SUBSTANCE AND E F FE C T
_A_lTTHORIZED RECOVERY BY THE PLAINTIFF E\TEN THOUGH HIS NEGLIGENCE
WAS THE SOLE ·CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT
~\XD E\rEN THOUGH DEFENDANIT'S NEGLIGEXCE '\rAs NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
THE ACCIDENT.
By Instruction No. 16 the court charged the jury
as follows:
'"You are instructed that before you can return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendant in this case you must find from a
preponderance of the evidence the following propositions to be true:
1. That the defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that
there was an unsecured coil of wire located on
a post in its shop at the time and place alleged.
2. That the defendant knew, or in the exercise
of reasonable care should have known that
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the presence of said coil of wire on said post at
said time and place constituted an unreasonable
hazard to employees working in said shop, assuming that the said employees would handle
said wire with ordinary and reasonable care.
3. That the plaintiff in attempting to remove said coil of wire from said post sustained
the injuries for which he makes claim, or that said
injuries were not solely caused by the negligence
of the plaintiff.
In the event you find the foregoing proposition to be true, then you will return a verdict in
favor of plaintiff and against the defendant and
assess damages in the manner set out in Instruction Nos. 14 and 17.
In the event you find that the injuries were
solely caused by the negligence of the plaintiff
or that the defendant was not neglgent, you must
return a verdict in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff, no cause of action."
Due exception to said instruction was taken by defendant's counsel (R. 208, 209).
Instruction No. 16 is similar to defendant's requested
instruction No. 6 except that defendant's requested instruction required that the jury find both that the plaintiff sustained injury in removing the coil of 'vire on the
post and that the injuries were not solely caused by the
negligence of the plaintiff. The instruction given by the
court authorized the jury to return a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff if the jury found either that the plaintiff
""as injured in removing the coil of wire or that the negligence of the plaintiff was not the sole cause of the
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tained in defendant's request to the effect that the jury
,,·a::; authorized to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant if they found the indicated propositions to be true.
The instruction authorized recovery in the absence
of a finding of proximate cause. For example, if the
jury found that plaintiff was not guilty of negligence
'rhich was the sole cause of the accident, they were
authorized to return a verdict for plaintiff even though
they should also find that the plaintiff was not injured
in re1noving the wire from the post as he claimed. On
the other hand, if the jury found that the plaintiff was
injured in removing the wire from the post, they were
authorized to return a verdict for the plaintiff even
though plaintiff's injuries were the sole cause of the
accident.
We submit that the instruction is manifestly erroneous and prejudicial and requires the reve~rsal of this
case.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COlTRT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUC'TION NO.
6 IN\TOLVING AN ISSUE NOT PRESENTED
BY THE PLEADINGS OR THE EVIDENICE
AND NOT BEFORE THE COURT OR THE
JURY.
By Instruction No. 6 given at plaintiff's request
the court charged the jury, inter alia (R. 44):
"Any such employee shall not be held to have
assumed the risks of his employment occasioned
by
such negligence."
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Exceptions were duly taken upon the ground that
the instruction ,vas immaterial to any issue before the
court and jury and prejudicial to the defendant (R. 208).
The defendant did not assert the doctrine of assumption of risk as a defense. Defendant offered no instructions and no argument for the proposition that plaintiff
was barred from recovery because he must be held to have
assumed certain risks. There was absolutely nothing in
the pleadings or the evidence or in the other instructions of the court that would in any 'vay intimate that
assumption of risk was in issue.
In the case of Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399,
142 P. 2d 649, this court held that an instruction on
assumed risk should not have been given 'Yhere it 'Yas
not raised as an issue. There the court held that the
defendant had not been prejudiced by the instruction
since it was negligent in other respects as a matter of
law. However, it 'Yas clearly pointed out that it is in
no case proper to instruct a jury on abstract issues of
law. Riding v. Roylance, 63 Utah 221, 224 Pac. 2S5. Later
in the case of Moore v. D. & R. G., -± Utah 2d 255, 292
P. 2d 849, the Supreme Court considered a similar instruction. In that case the court reversed and remanded
for a ne'Y trial. The decision, though holding it unnecessary to determine whether the instruction on assumed
risk 'vas reversible error, decided that said instruction
was "improper and should not be given in the ne'v trial.''
The effect of the instruction is to eonvey to the mind
of a juror that the law favors the injured " . . orlanan over
his e1nployer. Where, as here, the doctrine of assruned
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risk is not explained to the jury, the instruction can only
confuse and 1nislead. A juror might well wonder why
the court is instructing on this prop·osi tion. More likely
the juror n1ight try to apply it to the issues which are
aetually raised. If a jury attempted to apply it either to
the issue of plaintiff's negligence or defendant's contributory negligence, the possibility of misapplication of
the la\Y is apparent.

\v·e think that under the facts of this case the decision
of the Nebraska Supreme Court in Ellis v. Union Pacific
R. Co., 1-l-8 Neb. 515, 27 N.W. 2d 921, is controlling. In
that case, where a similar instruction on assumption of
risk "ras given, the court said:
"Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense. In the case at bar it was not made an issue
either by the pleadings or the evidence. Therefore it had no relation to the issues in the case and
should not have been given."
l~nder

the facts of the Ellis case the improper instruction was held prejudicial error.
The court should settle the proposition in this case so
that this strawman may not continually rise in F.E.L.A.
cases to confuse and mislead juries in favor of the employee. We submit that the error here was prejudicial.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFEXDANT'S REQUESIT·ED INSTRU,CTIONS
NOS. 6 AND 11 WHICH WOULD HAVE. DIRECTED THE JURY THAT IN D·ETERMINIXG WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT
W.A.SSponsored
NEGLIGENT
THEY
SHOULD
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TO CO·NSIDERATION THAT DEFENDANT
HAD THE RIGHT TO ASS·UME THAT ITS
EMPLOYEES WOULD EXERCISE REASONABLE CARE FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY.
Defendant's requested instructions Nos. 6 and 11
proposed charges to the jury to the effect that the defendant was entitled to assume that its employees would
exercise reasonable care for their own safety (R. 28, 33).
Defendant took exception to the failure of the court to
give these proposed instructions (R. 207).
As already pointed out under Point I, the defendant
had no duty to anticipate that the plaintiff would jerk or
pull the wire from the post. If there had been such a
duty to foresee negligence on the part of its employees
plaintiff could argue that the jury was authorized to
conclude that the roll of wire should have been bound
so that when employees negligently and carelessly jerked
it about it could not inflict injury. It was of vital importance to the defendant to get a clear picture before the
jury as to defendant's duty to plaintiff.
The point of the defendant's case was that defendant could not reasonably be expected to foresee the injury
which occurred here; that the plaintiff """as negligent
and that the defendant had no duty to foresee the plaintiff's neglect. Although there are instructions in this case
defining negligence and instructions defining the duty
to furnish a reasonably safe place to work (R. 45), there
is nowhere found in these instructions the important
proposition that the defendant """as not required to foresee negligence on the part of the plaintiff. We submit
that the failure of the court to instruct on this proposition
constituted prejudicial error.
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POINT VII.
1\ GROSS AWARD OF $30,000 FOR PLAIN-

TIFF'S ALLEGED INJURY IS SO EX·CESSI\~~~ UNDER THE CIRCUMSTAN·CES OF
THIS CASE AS ITO CO~MPEL THE CONCLUSION THAT THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED
BY PASSION AND PREJUDICE IN ASSESSING DA:\lAGES AND THE TRIAL ·COURT
COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN DE~YING DE.FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW
TRIAL BY REASON OF EXCESSIVE
DAMAGES.
The jury assessed plaintiff's damages at $30,000 and
cut the award by $7,500 by reason of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiff.
Siciliano was 61 years of age at the time of the trial.
He lost about seven weeks of work as a result of the accident (R. 107). Other than this loss of time his eye injury
did not prevent him from working steadily and he was
~till working full time when the case was tried (R. 108).
The full use of his eye is not lost.
From a monetary standpoint, the financial loss to
Siciliano does not exceed $560. (R. 106, 107).
We submit that the evidence cannot justify a ve·rdict
which assesses plaintiff's damages at $30,000. That
amount is over five (5) times the average annual income
of Siciliano. At present insurance rates, $30,000 would
provide Siciliano at 61 years of age with more than $2,200
per year annual income or $180 monthly income for the
rest of his life (Insurance ·Co. of North America, Rate
Book.) Invested at 6 percent, $30,000 \vould yield apSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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proximately $150 income per month and still preserve
the entire principal.
Whether the damages in any instance are excessive,
must, of course, be determined in accordance with the
p·eculiar facts and circumstances of each use. Under the
facts of the case at bar we think that it is manifest that
the ve·rdict of the jury was influenced by sympathy, passion and prejudice and that the verdict below should not
be allowed to stand.
CONCLUSION
It is most respectfully submitted that the defendant
was not guilty of any actionable negligence which contributed to plaintiff's injuries; and that the plaintiff's
negligence was the sole cause of the accident. The case
should be remanded to the district court with instructions
to vacate the judgment below and enter judgment in favor
of ~the defendant. Further, we respectfully submit that
the trial court erred in excusing jurors from the panel;
in its instructions to the jury and in denying defendant's
motion for a new trial and that the damages awarded
were so excessive that the judgment below should be set
aside. In the event the cause is not remanded with instructions to dismiss, "\Ve submit that defendant should be
granted a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,
\:rAN C0 TT, BAGLE.Y, CORN\VALL
& McCARTHY,
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
GRANT MACFARLANE, JR.,
Counsel for Defendant
and Appellant.
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